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PUBLIC INJURY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
SECONDARY MEANING IN THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION *
RIoEiARD H. STERN t AND JOEL E. HllFFmAN
The continued doubts of courts as to the proper function of the
private damages or injunction suit in trade regulation law are reflected
as much in the interstices of analysis as in overt doctrinal content. The
policy question is usually put, when articulated at all in terms of doc-
trine, as whether "public injury" is an essential ingredient of the
cause of action. According to the proponents of the "public injury"
doctrine, to be heard in court the private litigant must bring a suit
which will vindicate the public interest, and not merely redress his
private griefs. In this view, the relief given the plaintiff is deemed but
incidental to the main purpose of redressing injuries to the competitive
process,1 or to the public at large, in whose behalf the plaintiff functions
as a "private attorney general." 2 With those who do not accept the
"public injury" rationale of trade regulation law, however, the focus
of inquiry is placed on the balance of plaintiff's and defendant's inter-
ests, without specific reference to the more general economic impact
of the disputeY
* Grateful acknowledgment is made to Professor Friedrich Kessler of the Yale
Law School for his many helpful comments.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Government. Some of the material in the present article appeared in a dif-
ferent form in 32 CoxN. B.J. 381 (1958).
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I The basis of liability thus resembles that of the common-law public nuisance
action, which must be rested upon the infringement of interests both common to the
general public and peculiar to the plaintiff. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ; The King v. Lloyd, 4 Esp. 200, 170 Eng. Rep. 691 (K.B.
1802).
2 See Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772
(1943); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 296 (1939).
3 Compare Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3
ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 175 (1958) (private injury sufficient, proof of public injury
unnecessary), with American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281,
284-85 (6th Cir. 1900) (private injury must be shown, public injury insufficient).
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Although most familiar in the antitrust context,4 the "public
injury" controversy, under the name "secondary meaning," permeates
unfair competition and trademark law as well.' The term "unfair
competition" has been applied to many different business torts, among
them trade libel, malicious interference with contractual relations, com-
mercial bribery, espionage, and predatory price-cutting.6 The phrase
"unfair methods of competition," as used in section 5 (a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,7 has an even broader scope.8 This Article
does not deal, however, with "public injury" in connection with these
regrettable lapses of business ethics. Its scope is restricted to that
older sense of "unfair competition" which is closely akin to trademark
4 Scarcely a term of the Supreme Court passes now without an antitrust "public
injury" case. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Among the more sig-
nificant court of appeals opinions are Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Ruddy Brook
Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952); Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519 (10th
Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court cases have uniformly held that public injury is not
an additional element of the cause of action, to be proved along with a substantive
violation and consequent private injury. This does not mean, of course, that an
actual or probable impairment of the vigor of competition may not have to be shown,
in a non-per se case, in order to make out the substantive violation. In a more
sophisticated sense then, "public injury" may be identified with injury to competition
("unreasonable restraint of trade," "substantial lessening of competition"), as dis-
tinguished from mere injury to competitors. As used in this article "public injury"
will not refer to matters of pleading; it will be applied only in connection with the
question of whether impact on the public is necessary to make out a substantive
violation.
5 See also § 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(b) (1958), which requires as a condition to the filing of a
complaint that it "appear to the Commission!' that a proceeding would be to the public
interest. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 n.4 (1959) (dictum). There is, of course, no private
damages action under § 5. Kessler & Stern, Competition, Cmtract, and Vertical
Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 64 n.282 (1959) (collecting authorities).
Under patent or copyright law, where there is a statutory monopoly for a limited
period, no public injury need be shown to authorize a suit against an infringer, but the
"misuse" doctrine bars enforcement of the monopoly when it is being used in contra-
vention of the public interest, or in derogation of the common right. See Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
In related regulatory fields, see Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,
14-15 (1942) ("[P]rivate litigants have standing only as representatives of the public
interest. . . . [T]he rights to be vindicated are those of the public and not of the
private litigants.") ; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 632 (2d Cir. 1953) (Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act); Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (Bituminous Coal Act) ; Seatrain Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 619, 625 (D. Del), aff'd per curialn, 355 U.S. 181
(1957) (Interstate Commerce Act); FCC v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA),
319 U.S. 239, 259-60 (1943) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
6 See Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Ray. 175 (1936).
738 Stat 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1958).
8 See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 354 (1941).
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infringement: the tort which the first entrant to a market alleges when
a competitor enters the same arena seeking to sell similar goodsY
Under the "public injury" rule, as it is applied to unfair com-
petition law, the first entrant is allowed to protect his market position
by an unfair competition action only if the public has been injured in
that it was deceived by the newcomer as to the source of his goods-
that is, the newcomer has misled the public into buying his goods
by palming them off as those of his rival. Absent public injury in the
form of "palming off," however, the first entrant would be denied a
cause of action against the newcomer. Thus, in the traditional view,
as enunciated by its most persuasive spokesman, the late Judge Learned
Hand:
[I]t is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the
plaintiff . . . show that the appearance of his wares has in
fact come to mean that some particular person-the plaintiff
may not be individually known-makes them, and that the
public cares who does make them, and not merely for their
appearance and structure. .... The critical question of fact
at the outset always is whether the public is moved in any de-
gree to buy the article because of its source .... 0
Others, however, believe that the law should protect the innovator
against any loss of trade to an imitator seeking a "free ride" on the
coattails of his rival, and that it should do so without regard to the
presence or absence of public deception. Thus, one leading com-
mentator asserts that "whether the public is actually deceived, or
whether the public cares anything about the source . . . is of no im-
portance." ' This Article attempts to explore the public interest con-
sequences of adopting the one or the other of these conflicting rationales
for unfair competition law.
"Secondary meaning," in trademark-unfair competition parlance,
is that inference of source to which Judge Hand referred, which a
purchaser draws from the appearance or other identifying character-
9 Nor does the scope of this article include cases involving a newcomer's attempts
to utilize the actual physical marketing or distribution equipment of another. E.g.,
Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores, Inc., 215
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1954); Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925), appeal
di issed per curiam, 10 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1926); Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Davis, 209
Fed. 917, 923 (S.D. Ohio 1913), aff'd per curiam, 215 Fed. 349 (6th Cir. 1914);
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Co., 161 Fed. 219 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1908).
Compare Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Auto Acetylene Light Co., 191 Fed. 90 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1910) (common law), appeal dismtssed per curiant, 191 Fed. 1005 (6th Cir.
1911) ; Insto-Gas Corp., 54 F.T.C. 741 (1957) (Clayton Act § 3). This Article deals
only with copying or imitation.
1o Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917).
113 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 80.6, at 1371 (2d ed.
1950).
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istics of the product and which may be a principal factor in motivating
the purchase. The term "secondary meaning" began as a trademark-
law concept applied to descriptive words, particularly geographical
ones, which had come to be associated with the product of some par-
ticular manufacturer. These words thus acquired a secondary mean-
ing, in addition to their primary, descriptive meaning. In the case
of "Glenfield Starch," for example, "Glenfield's" primary connotation
of the town of Glenfield was supplemented, or perhaps for many even
superseded, by the secondary meaning of one Wotherspoon's mill as
a source of starch.'2 As it is now employed, largely because of the
adoption of this usage in Judge Hand's powerful opinions in the lead-
ing cases,13 the term is applied to the physical appearance of the goods
as well as the name. Stated in terms of art, then, the dispute over
the proper function of the private unfair competition action 14 is the
dispute over whether the existence of "secondary meaning" is an in-
dispensable condition to maintenance of the first entrant's suit.
Assume that a manufacturer intentionally copies a novel element
of an innovating manufacturer's name, packaging, or product. The
copied element may (1) help fulfill the purpose to be served by the
product in the hands of the consumer, 5 (2) indicate to the purchaser
the nature of the product, 6 or (3) indicate the source of the product.'7
If the copied feature has the first-named quality, it is deemed to be
12 Wotherspoon v. Currie, L.R. 5 H.L. 508 (1872); see Reddaway v. Banham,
[1896] A.C. 199 ("camel hair belting"). To be sure, as Judge Hand pointed out in
the passage quoted in text accompanying note 10 mupra, the maker need not be indi-
vidually known by name, and a notion of some single, though anonymous, source will
suffice for purposes of secondary meaning. See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey
Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918); Saalfield Publishing Co. v. G. & C.
Merriam Co., 238 Fed. 1, 8-9 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917).
The use of "secondary" to designate the meaning of the words which has, in fact,
come to be their usual and primary significance in the market has aptly been termed
"a triumph of unintended obfuscation." KIAPLAN & BRowN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT,
UNFAIR CoEtPTmION, AND OTHER Topics 490 (1960). But this term of art is by
now thoroughly entrenched in the case law, and the writers will use it in its con-
ventional sense throughout this article ,rather than attempt to coin a more felicitous
phrase. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 716, comment b (1938).
13 These cases are discussed in text accompanying notes 74-90 infra.
14 This is, in fact, the dispute over the role of unfair competition law itself, for,
unlike the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act, the law of unfair
competition with which we are concerned is applied solely in private litigation.
IS E.g., the shape of a set of dishes or the design printed on them may help fulfill
the aesthetic or utilitarian purpose for which the consumer buys them. See Pagliero
v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
16 E.g., "Rhine wine" on the label indicates to prospective purchasers the particular
type of wine in the bottle. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 720, comment c (1938).
17 E.g., the shape of the Haig & Haig "pinch bottle" indicates to some shoppers
the source of its contents without the need of a label. See Ex parte Haig & Haig,
Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r of Patents 1958).
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"functional." '8 The second quality is termed "descriptiveness." "9
The third quality, "source-indicativeness," as we have seen, is closely
identified with "secondary meaning." o These terms designate the
three principal operative facts on which courts have focused their at-
tention in adjusting the competing claims of innovators, copyists, and
the public under the "public injury" doctrine.
The "misappropriation" doctrine operates independently of func-
tionality, descriptiveness, and, above all, secondary meaning. Focus-
sing exclusively on the question of the innovator's "property rights"
in the copied feature,21 this approach emphasizes the moral quality of
I8 "Functionality" has been restricted by some to those minimal features without
which an object would not be considered to be a member of its class. Thus, in
Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D. Cal.
1954), the court proscribed copying of the ornamental aspects of an ashtray, because
"holding ashes is its function . . . ." In Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1952), however, copying designs on dishes was permitted, since the
design was recognized to be an "essential selling feature" of the product Id. at 343.
The court said that "china satisfies a demand for the aesthetic as well as for the
utilitarian . . . . [T]he design is, at least in part, the response to such demand
. ... " Id. at 344.
The Pagliero case represents the more common view. See, e.g., Vaughan Novelty
Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 175-76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 820 (1953); J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949,
954 (8th Cir. 1941). This view is set out in RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 742 & comment a
(1938) (feature is nonfunctional only if, when omitted, nothing of substantial value
in the goods is lost).
19 See generally RESTATMENT, TORTS § 721 (1938) (descriptive of ingredients,
quality, properties, functions). As the term will be used here, it will not be restricted
to words or arbitrary symbols, i.e., conventional trademarks. Instead, it will be
applied to more general product configurations as well. Packaging, for example,
frequently appears to be descriptive, in that certain arbitrary configurations become
generic for classes of product. In Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395
(2d Cir. 1947), a certain bottle shape appears to have acquired the special significance
that the contents were cologne. Compare the very similar bottle shapes used for the
various brands of liquid heavy-duty household cleaning agents. Arbitrary colors may
also become associated with products and identify them-brown for cola-flavored
drinks, see Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc., 155 F.2d 59, 65-66 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946) ; pink for soothing stomachics, see Norwich Phar-
macal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 919 (1960) ; yellow-green for the liquid detergents referred to supra.
20 Secondary meaning requires (1) source-indicativeness of the feature, an asso-
ciation created in the minds of the consumer betveen configuration of the goods, or
the name applied to them, and some single, although perhaps anonymous, source, plus
(2) the consumers' caring sufficiently about whose goods they buy to be induced by
the presence of the feature to purchase goods with that configuration or label. This
is the test of Crescent Tool, quoted in text at note 10 .rpra. To the same effect,
see, e.g., Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 697 (2d Cir.
1961); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1947); Sinko
v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1942); W. E. Bassett Co. v.
H. C. Cook Co., 164 F. Supp. 278, 283 (D. Conn. 1958). See also discussion in
notes 74-90 infra and accompanying text.
21 But see Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown, 55 HARv. L.
REv. 595, 597 n.9 (1942) (characterizing the interest as "relational," rather than
"property") ; Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAmN.
L. Rxv. 483, 498 (1958). The pragmatic difference between the two formulations is
unclear, however, with respect to overcoming the serious difficulties in application of
the doctrine discussed in notes 147-56 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Callmann,
mspra at 597.
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the copyist's conduct, and the only public interest 2 with which it is
directly concerned is the public interest in maintaining ethical stand-
ards of commercial behavior. "Misappropriation" is the only remain-
ing important term of art used in the discussion, and it is employed
exclusively by those who oppose the public injury doctrine. Followers
of traditional doctrine, such as Judge Hand, do not deem misappropria-
tion an operative concept in deciding unfair competition cases; the
opposing school, as we have noted, returns the compliment by dis-
regarding "secondary meaning and all that."
The principal impetus for the misappropriation doctrine has been
the celebrated Supreme Court decision in International News Serv.
v. Associated Press.'A INS had pirated AP news reports and sold
them as its own product. The Supreme Court, over a vigorous
Brandeis dissent, found unfair competition: "It is said that the ele-
ments of unfair competition are lacking because there is no attempt by
defendant to palm off its goods as those of the complainant ....
But we cannot concede that the right to equitable relief is confined to
that class of cases.. . , 25 A case for relief from unfair competition
2 2 We submit that it begs the "public injury" question to regard the innovator's
claims by themselves as invoking the public interest in the same sense as do the con-
sumer's claims to the material benefits of competition. In this sense of "public injury,"
any private harm injures the public, and all injury is public injury. But the whole
thrust of the "public injury" doctrine is to the contrary. Cf. FTC v. Klesner, 280
U.S. 19, 28 (1929), in which the Court stated that "the mere fact that it is to the
interest of the community that private rights shall be respected is not enough to sup-
port a finding of 'public interest'." Commenting on this case, Callman regretfully
observes that "the courts have seemingly devoted themselves to the protection of the
more materialistic interests of the general public," rather than the "idealistic interest"
in "observing the rules of the game." 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKS § 3.4, at 55-56 (2d ed. 1950). Is not the maximization of the materialistic
interests of the general public (the greatest goods for the greatest number) the "rule
of the game" in our social order? See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958).
23 See Callmann, supra note 21, at 599. The outlawing of misappropriation
might also be defended as consistent with the policies of free competition, despite its
primary concern with standards of conduct, on the ground that it stimulates innovation.
The foreclosure of copying is said to force businessmen to "innovate around" their
rivals' products and thus benefit the public by producing a greater diversity of inno-
vations directed to the same end. See James P. Marsh Corp. v. United States Gauge
Co., 129 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 649, 653 (1947); cf. Frost, The Patent Systems and the
Modern Economy, S. Doc. No. 22, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1957). But cf. Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 980 n.13 (2d Cir. 1948) (querying
"reward to innovator" theory of unfair competition); Standard Brands, Inc. v.
Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 n.12 (2d Cir. 1945) (same) ; Stedman, supra at 662 (same
in patent context). It is questionable whether, with regard to any specific product,
this type of competition is a satisfactory substitute for the "hard competition" in
marketing which is reflected by lower prices to the public. More generally, with
regard to the economy as a whole, channeling research and development facilities
into different methods for achieving particular ends is hardly the most desirable
allocation of limited resources. See STAFF OF SUBCOMa!. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., A
EcoNoMic REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 50-52 (Comm. Print 1958).
24248 U.S. 215 (1918).
25 Id. at 241-42.
[Vol.llO :935
UNFAIR COMPETITION
exists, said the Court, when there is misappropriation of the product of
plaintiff's "labor, skill and money," when "defendant in appropriating
it [news] and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has
not sown . . . appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have
sown.. . in order to divert . . . profit from those who have
earned it to those who have not ... 26
The case was ignored for many years, and courts declined to
follow its suggestion that unfair competition doctrine be expanded to
protect this interest.2 7 Indeed, Judge Wyzanski once stated his
belief that a majority of the Supreme Court would now follow the
Brandeis dissent and overrule INS if given the opportunity.2 s The
New York courts, however, starting with cases involving the mis-
appropriation of news and artistic productions,' retrieved INS from
its innocuous desuetude and gradually extended the doctrine into the
area of unfair competition in the sale of goods.8 ° The INS doctrine
was codified into positive law by New York in 1955.8 Several other
states have adopted similar legislation, 2 and a bill has been introduced
into Congress to make it the federal law.'
I. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE POLICIES AT STAKE
Courts rarely articulate precisely, if they recognize at all, the
choice they make in unfair competition cases between the two com-
26 Id. at 239-40.
27 See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952) ; National
Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940) ;
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S.
728 (1930). Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), INS has had, of
course, little precedential weight. Cf. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity
Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1956).
28 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46
F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Mass. 1942).
29 See Metropolitan Opera Assn v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 279 App.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951) (commercial recording of opera broadcast);
Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.
S.2d 845 (1938) (newsreel photos purporting to be of "Rangers" in Garden, but actually
of "Rangers" on road); Rudolph Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Pathe News, Inc., 235 App.
Div. 774, 255 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1932) (memorandum decision) (pirated motion
pictures of Sharkey-Walker fight); Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Muzak,
177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (rebroadcast of World Series).80 The New York cases, in federal and state courts, are reviewed in KAPLAN &
BROWN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 508-09, 597-611; Stern, Buyer Indifference and
Secondary Meaning in Unfair Competition and Trademark Cases, 32 CONN. B.J.
381, 387-88, 391-92 (1958); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 406, 418-21, 426-30 (1961).
31 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d.
8 2 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 106-115 (1956); IL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 22
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 110, § 7A (1954) (substantially
same wording as New York statute).
83 H.R. 4590, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). There had been some who believed
that Congress had already enacted a federal law of unfair competition in the Lanham
Act §§43(a), 44(h)-(i), 60 Stat. 441, 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), 1126(h)-(i)
(1958), but the preponderance of the cases are now to the contrary. See authorities
collected in Kessler & Stern, supra note 5, at 100 n.455.
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peting rationales and their underlying policies. Instead, the decisions
are often shrouded in unhelpful conclusions phrased in the legal mysti-
cism of "secondary meaning" on the one hand or of "property rights"
on the other. 4 The two decisions discussed below reveal the too com-
mon judicial failure to recognize the operative facts in the case and
illustrate the inadequacy of much of the legal analysis in this
area. Most important, they illustrate the unsatisfactory results to
which such faulty analysis may lead.
A. The Notre Dame Case
The Notre Dame case, John Roberts Mfg. Co. v. University of
Notre Dame du Lac, 5 involved the distribution of class rings by an
unlicensed manufacturer in competition with the "official" product
sponsored by the university. The rings, exact duplicates of one
another, embodied the university seal and monogram, as well as the
name "University of Notre Dame." In his merchandising, the copyist
prominently featured the name of his firm as the manufacturer of the
ring he sold, and he placed his own trademark on the ring itself."6
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals deemed this relevant,
however, for as the district court put it, "no one is so naive as to
think for one moment that a student . . . is going to ascertain who
makes the ring before he buys it." " What was deemed the crucial
fact was that in making his rings the copyist used the Notre Dame
name, seal, and monogram without the university's consent, an ap-
propriation of property rights which the court equated to the purloin-
ing of cash from the university's safe deposit box.
5
The copyist sought to defend his use of the university's name, in
his advertising and on the product itself, on the ground that "Notre
Dame" was descriptive in that context. But the court of appeals tersely
declared that this claim "borders on the preposterous." " The argu-
34 See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLuM.
L. RErv. 809, 814-17 (1935); cf. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S.
499, 502-03 (1945).
35 258 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ind. 1957).
36152 F. Supp. at 271.
37 d. at 271-72.
38258 F.2d at 259, 262. For a similar example of purloining, see Vassar College
v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912), where the loose wiles of
the copyist included appropriation of the college name and seal, with "Vassar College"
and "Purity and Wisdom" on the seal replaced by "Vassar Chocolates" and "Always
Fresh." The court, however, found no legally cognizable injury. Compare Yale
Univ. v. Benneson, 147 Conn. 254, 159 A.2d 169 (1960), with Cornell Univ. v. Messing
Bakeries, Inc., 285 App. Div. 490, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1955).
39 258 F.2d at 261.
[Voi.110:935
UNFAIR COMPETITION
ment, however, deserves less cavalier treatment; a Notre Dame class
ring can hardly be called anything else40 Perhaps, the value to the
public of such descriptiveness is outweighed by other considerations.
But determination of this issue is more hampered than furthered by
denial that use of the name involves descriptiveness at all.
Furthermore, although functionality was discussed by neither
trial nor appellate court, the university name, seal, and monogram are
clearly functional when used in connection with this product. Without
these features, the ring would be something else, perhaps desirable for
other purposes, but not as a Notre Dame class ring. And to what-
ever extent esthetic appeal is a factor in the sale of these rings, fur-
ther functionality is involved. Neither court purported to protect
the design of the ring qua design 41 or qua quasi-diploma.4  The thrust
of both opinions goes to the unauthorized use of the symbols in the
ring, which are deemed the incorporeal property of the university. To
be sure, the use of these symbols might justifiably be prevented, under
conventional doctrine, had the elements been used to cast an aura of
University sponsorship over the product.43 But since such "palming
off" was assumed away here,' the court was eliminating competition
in the sale of the ring in the name only of protecting the separate ele-
ments of the unprotected (or unprotectable) whole.45 As is the case
4 0 Compare Saalfield Publishing Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 238 Fed. 1, 7 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917), where the court held that a dictionary based
on the original Noah Webster dictionary (already in the public domain by then)
could hardly be called anything but a "Webster"; Gotham Music Serv., Inc. v.
Denton & Haskins Music Publishing Co., 259 N.Y. 86, 89, 181 N.E. 57, 58 (1932),
where the court held that there was no practical way to designate the song "St.
James Infirmary" but by its name; RESTA EmENT, ToRTs § 721, comment a (1938)
("Plow" cannot be a trademark for plows).
41 Compare Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930), with Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), discussed in text at notes 91-92 infra.
42The university's interest in protecting itself against forgery of its diplomas,
which it issues pursuant to state regulations, is unquestionable. The real danger to
the university of having its reputation cast into the hands of strangers, see Yale Elec.
Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928), warrants its possession of power
to determine who will possess Notre Dame diplomas. We question, however, whether
these considerations apply to selling class rings, for little but a commercial venture
appears to be involved. The university did not attempt to place any equitable servi-
tude on the chattels, cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911), and it specifically contemplated use of the university emblems (in a
special version of the ring) by "feminine friends and feminine members of the families
of qualified wearers of the official Notre Dame ring." 152 F. Supp. at 273.
43 See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948);
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (leading case) ; Standard
Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion)
(explaining rule).
44 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
45 Compare RESTATEmENT, ToRTs §724 (1938) (protected whole may be made
up of unprotected elements). We believe that the design of the ring should not be
protected in the name of protection of the elements, when the kind of protection the
elements are properly to be conceded is trademark-trade name protection (see id.
§ 730), whereas the only kind of protection at stake for the whole is protection from
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with descriptiveness, it is arguable that the public interest in unmonop-
olized functionality is subordinate to other values; but the courts owe
the parties and the public, which ultimately feels the market impact of
unfair competition decisions, a more explicit balancing, or at least
recognition, of competing policies than can be discerned here4 6 Such
a balancing is particularly necessary when as in the Notre Dame case 47
the purchasers of the product are indifferent to its source, since the
absence of any countervailing public interest in preventing the copying
makes the policy favoring competition, which is usually deemed socially
useful, especially significant.
B. The Atmos Clock Case
A conceptually more complex situation was involved in the Atmos
Clock case, Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Con-
stantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,4' the opinion in which was written by
the late Judge Jerome Frank. The innovator Vacheron distributed the
distinctive "Atmos" clock, operated solely by a mechanism sensitive to
atmospheric temperature and pressure changes. Although distinctive,
the Atmos was neither patented nor copyrighted. 9 The copyist Master-
crafters manufactured the "308" clock, which closely resembled the
Atmos in external appearance, but which relied on a relatively inex-
pensive electric motor within the clock for power. While the Atmos
retailed at $175, the 308 sold for $40. The district court found as a
fact that buyers of the 308 were not deceived into thinking they were
buying an Atmos, for Mastercrafters' name was on the dial and an
electric cord hanging from the back of the case was plainly visible."0
The buyers knew what they were doing; they paid $40 for a "luxury
design," "prestigious" clock which their guests would imagine had
cost them $175 (provided the cord was kept out of sight). Clearly,
the only people who could be deceived would be the guests. Hence the
district court allowed neither damages nor an injunction to the
innovator. 5'
product design copying. The use of the elements in the Notre Dame case was not
"trademark use," cf. American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.
1960); Hansen v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 106 Fed. 691 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900), although
trademark protection was what was granted.
46 See Kessler, Arthur Linton Corbi--A Tribute, 64 YAIE L.J. 161, 166 (1954).
47 See text accompanying note 37 wtpra.
48221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955), reversing 119 F.
Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
49 Compare Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
50 119 F. Supp. at 211-12.




The court of appeals reversed, holding that the likelihood of con-
fusion of visitors to 308-buyers' homes, who would fail to observe the
well-concealed electrical cord and therefore assume that the clock was
an Atmos, sufficed to render the copyist's conduct actionable. Judge
Frank's opinion raises perplexing doctrinal problems (some of which 2
are far beyond the scope of this Article).
The interest which the court of appeals purports to protect is that
of the public qua the buyer's guest who may be misled into believing
that his host can afford the $175 Atmos. In order to provide such
protection, the court developed, sub silentio, a doctrine of contributory
unfair competition analogous to contributory infringement in patent
law.1 The court conceded that whatever unfair practices were in-
volved did not prejudice the actual buyers of the clock, who received
fair warning, and the court's determination of impermissible conduct
was based solely on the copyist's contribution to the host's tasteless
behavior.
Even if one accepts the premise that there is a public interest in
frustrating this sort of social climbing,' it does not necessarily follow
that the interest should be vindicated by the award of an injunction or
damages against the copyist. The coordinate public interest in easy
access to the desirable features of the Atmos design deserves, at least,
to be weighed in determining the issue. An analysis which purports
to revolve about protection of the public should take into account the
public interest in keeping the esthetic functionality of the design, which
was unprotected by design patent or copyright, effectively in the public
domain; recognition of the possibility of source-confusion should be
the beginning, not the end, of analysis.
Although the court did not choose to articulate it, it would never-
theless appear that the real basis of the decision, and the only one at
all tenable, is that Mastercrafters "misappropriated" the Atmos de-
52 See text preceding note 58 infra (general theory of contributory unfair com-
petition).
53 See Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d
266, 269 (7th Cir. 1943); cf. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S.
526, 529-31 (1924); Hiram Walker & Sons v. Corning & Co., 255 Fed. 129, 131
(N.D. Ill. 1918); RESTATEmENT, ToRTs §§ 738-39 (1938) (trademarks and trade
names). Compare the district court's opinion in the Notre Dame case, where an
asserted part of the copyist's wrong was that he gave sophomores, nonalumni, and
other "unqualified persons" (e.g., women not the "feminine members of the families
of the qualified wearers of the official Notre Dame ring," 152 F. Supp. at 273) a means
to misrepresent themselves to the public as to their scholastic (or other) accomplish-
ments. Id. at 275.
54 But cf. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 n.13 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring). In our view, the law of unfair competition exists to protect
the public only qua buyer or direct consumer. See K. Taylor Distilling Co. v. Food
Center, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 460, 462 (E.D. Mo. 1940) (dictum). See also note 138 infra.
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sign.55 There is some indication in the opinion that the court recog-
nized this. In discussing the question of burden of proof, the state-
ment is made that the copyist's "intention thus to reap financial benefits
from poaching on the reputation of the Atmos clock is of major im-
portance." " Whether a judge with the strong views on competition
that Jerome Frank had could have brought himself to articulate a "mis-
appropriation" decision is, however, most doubtful to these writers.57
But in that case, he had no business reaching the result he reached.
The moral, if any is appropriate, is that even a great judge can mis-
handle unfair competition problems by inadequate characterization of
the policy issues.
A further difficulty in the Atmos Clock analysis, but one unre-
lated to secondary meaning, lies in its treatment of contributory in-
fringement. Without attempting to formulate a general theory of
contributory unfair competition, a task which would carry us far afield
from "public injury," we suggest that on facts such as these the in-
novating manufacturer should have no cause of action against the
copyist-the alleged contributory unfair competitor-even assuming
that deceiving one's guests is unfair competition. It is axiomatic that
if the buyer cannot be amerced as a direct tortfeasor, the one who sells
to him cannot be amerced for contributing to a nonexistent tort.58 It
would appear, however, that there is no likelihood of pecuniary injury
to the maker or seller of Atmos by reason of the "direct" unfair com-
petition by the guest-deceiving, 308-buying host.59 Loss of the sales
55 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845, 848 (E.D.
La. 1960), suggesting that the decision in Atmos Clock reflects the peculiarities of
New York law. But see Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234
F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion) (denying that Atmos relies on
New York law).
56 221 F.2d at 466.
57 See, e.g., Charles D. Bridell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 418
(2d Cir. 1952); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d
Cir), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) ; Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167
F.2d 969, 980 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion). Compare Standard Brands, Inc. v.
Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion), with id. at 37 (majority
opinion).58 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961);
see id. at 347 (concurring opinion of Black, J., pointing out that Court is unanimous
on the point). Compare the cases granting relief against a copyist who deceives no
one but who enables his customers to deceive those who buy from them. E.g., William
R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924) (common law) ; FTC
v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) (Federal Trade Commission Act).
59 This would appear to be the practical significance of the decision on remand,
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., 123 U.S.P.Q. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The court of appeals had directed entry
of an injunction and the award of damages; the trial court was further directed to
determine whether the innovator was entitled to the copyist's profits made from the
infringing clocks. 221 F.Zd at 467. The district court then denied the latter, on
the basis that there was no palming off by the copyist of his clocks as products of the
innovator, nor any attempt to mislead the buyers, and the court left the innovator
to prove whatever damages he had actually sustained. 123 U.S.P.Q. at 382. Counsel
for Mastercrafters has informed us that the parties have made an out-of-court settle-
ment of the case.
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which would be made to these hosts can be hypothesized only on the
theory that they would buy the $175 clock if the $40 clock were re-
moved from the market-a dubious proposition. Loss of general repu-
tation with guests, who might be potential Atmos customers, could
occur if the guests were to conclude that Atmos must be an inferior
clock when such tasteless people as their hosts own it-but this too
is improbable. Arguably, potential customers aware of the existence
of the $40 imitation will refrain from buying the Atmos because it is
being stripped of its snob appeal by the deceptive acts of 308-possessing
(but cord-concealing) hosts. But the findings in Atmos contain not
the slightest indication that this was in fact occurring-nor would
there appear to be any practicable method to determine either the
existence or the extent of such behavior.0°
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASES
We submit that a more precise analysis of the issues raised by
unfair competition cases is called for than is revealed in these opinions.
Such an analysis may, on the one hand, be productively formulated in
terms of the respective roles of functionality, descriptiveness, and sec-
ondary meaning in the case. This approach leads to a "public injury"
theory of the unfair competition cause of action. Alternatively, the
analysis may be rested on the degree of protection warranted for the
innovator who expends effort and money on developing a product or
creating a market for it. This approach leads to a "misappropriation"
theory of the unfair competition cause of action, a theory which, it is
suggested below, is wholly unsatisfactory for resolving disputes in this
area. Finally, a synthesis of these approaches might be essayed. But
no court or commentator has attempted this, to the authors' knowledge,
and the "public injury" and "misappropriation" doctrines are too anti-
thetical to one another, we believe, to admit of mutual accommodation.
The first approach, based on presence or absence of functionality,
descriptiveness, or secondary meaning, permits characterization of the
possible fact patterns in cases in the following true-false tabular form:
60 Moreover, adjustment of the competing claims of snobbish consumers and their
suppliers on the one hand, and of social climbers and their suppliers on the other,
may well be a task for which courts-and perhaps even legislatures-are ill-suited.
See note 54 supra; note 64 infra. This policy determination may readily be trans-
lated into the conclusion that the innovator's injury is far too remote from the act
of deception properly to be deemed the proximate result of the direct unfair competi-
tion. Cf. 2 HAIPE & JAmEs, TORTS § 20.4 (1956) (treating proximate cause as a
public policy notion expanding or contracting relative to the value accorded the interest
involved).
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TABLE I
Is Descriptive Has Secondary Meaning
(1) T T T
(2) F T T
(3) T F T
(4) F F T
(5) T T F
(6) F T F
(7) T F F
(8) F F F
The eight possible combinations " fall into three main groups. In
cases 1 through 3, the copied feature both has secondary meaning and
is functional or descriptive. In case 4, the copying is of a source-
indicative, secondary-meaning feature only. In 5 through 8, no sec-
ondary meaning is involved in what is copied, while in 8, a subcategory
of the last group, what is copied is not functional or descriptive nor
does it have secondary meaning.
A. "'Palming Off": Neither Functionality Nor Descriptiveness
The least perplexing problems are presented by case 4. Here,
no thing of value is made more readily available to the public; no useful
description assists the prospective purchaser in his search. The copyist
merely diverts the innovator's trade to himself while deceiving the
public into thinking it is getting what it wants. Such "palming off"
would appear to have little to recommend it.
61 This treatment presupposes a two-valued logic. The recognition of varying
degrees of, say, descriptiveness or secondary meaning, ranging from zero to 100%,
presents greater problems of analysis than we believe appropriate, or, at any rate,
practicable. But see the English cases, notes 128-35 infra and accompanying text.
For an attempt in another legal field to replace two-valued logic with a continuous
variable system, see Allen, Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory




Assuming that the copyist's product is priced below the original,
however, the public is, arguably, benefited by getting merchandise
equivalent to the "genuine" article at lower cost; in this view, even
without a price differential no public harm would result if the copyist's
product is at least equal in quality to the original.' Underlying any
conclusion that a copy really lowers price to the consumer, however,
must be a finding of fact that, for the price, the copy is equal or supe-
rior in quality to the original (e.g., that it is three-quarters as good
and half the price)-a type of judgment that may tax the institutional
capacity of courts.' The presence of deception, moreover, raises a
noneconomic consideration which certainly should not be ignored,"
and which, in our view, is determinative: respect for individual
freedom of choice. 5
It would seem that no sufficient countervailing advantage of more
effective competition can be discerned which might justify the public
deception involved in this type of case. Hence a balancing of interests
is not required, since there is substantially nothing to balance against
the harm of deception. To be sure, the copying could be permitted,
provided a warning were placed on the product to alert prospective
purchasers as to the true source of the goods. But since there is no
serious public interest in this sort of copying, permitting it with a
02See Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray, 221 N.C.
269, 274, 20 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1942); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d
969, 980 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting); Standard Brands, Inc. v.
Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring) ; Brown, Advertising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALm L.J. 1165 (1948).
6
3 Note, 70 YALE L.J. 406, 433 (1961); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 308, 310 (1949). To be sure, courts frequently face equally taxing prob-
lems in other areas, but the returns in prospect from making these particular judg-
ments appear too slight to warrant the judicial expenditure entailed.
64 In Federal Trade Commission Act cases, under § 5(a), the courts seem to have
taken this view. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934) ; Benton
Announcements, Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1942). Compare Eastern
Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 758 (1943), with Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F2d 34, 41 n.13 (2d
Cir. 1945).
65 We assume here that the copied feature identifies source, although the pro-
ducer may not be individually known, and that the public cares enough who makes
the goods to be moved in some degree to buy the product because of its source. In
cases where a feature possessing some degree of source identification is copied, but
where there is not the slightest reason to think that source would have any influence
in motivating the buyer to buy (because, for example, what is involved is a cheap
trifle bought on its face for what it seems to be), the considerations of buyer "freedom
of choice" to which we have referred above are inapplicable. Solicitude for personal
freedom of choice is appropriate when a "choice" is to be made, however unwise it
may be, but not when there really is no "choice' because the buyer is utterly indifferent
to the alternatives. In short, we think the law of unfair competition should not care
about erroneous but academic (because they have no practical consequences) notions
of source. Without buyer concern for source, source-indicative features involve for
want of impact no "operative" facts. See generally Durable Toy & Novelty Co. v.
J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943), discussed
in text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
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warning serves, at best, no purpose. Thus courts and commentators
generally agree that an innovator should have a cause of action against
the copyist who attempts to palm his wares off as those of the in-
novator.6 In this area, at least, those who adhere to the traditional
view and those who seek to extend the scope of the law are not in
disagreement.
B. Cases in Which Secondary Meaning Is Absent
Categories 5 through 8 are alike in that the copied elements do
not possess a secondary meaning that the products embodying them
emanate from the innovator as their source; in 5, 6, and 7, moreover,
the copied elements are functional or descriptive. Probably the most
striking clash between those who believe that unfair competition law
exists only to prevent public injury in the form of confusion of source
and those who would use it to protect the "property rights" of "those
who sow" against misappropriation by "those who reap" 6 occurs in
these cases in which the product involved in the lawsuit is one about
whose source the public is indifferent. In such cases the purchaser is
never deceived as to the origin of the goods; there is no "palming off"
of the newcomer's goods as those of the innovator.
1. Cases Involving Functionality or Descriptiveness
A primary goal of our economic system is promotion of the wide
availability of useful goods at reasonable cost.6" To further this goal
on a long-range basis, the system encourages authors and inventors to
make their writings and discoveries available to the public by offering
them the quid pro quo of the exclusive right for a limited term to
market their innovations. 9 Whether a purported functional innova-
tion is substantial enough to merit the grant of exemption from
the basic policy of competition is determined, in the first instance, by
an agency created by statute for that purpose.7" If functional or de-
06 E.g., Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315,
336 (1938) ; William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1924).
6 '1See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
68 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
69 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 101 (1958); 35 U.S.C. §§ 154,
271 (a) (1958).
710See 17 U.S.C. §§201-02 (1958); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 6-7, 131-35 (1958). Sub-
stantiality of innovation is scrutinized very carefully for mechanically functional
innovations, and the patent grant is prima fade evidence that the claimed elements
comprise a new and useful invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958). When function-
ality is esthetic, however, the intensiveness of administrative scrutiny will vary with
whether the protection sought is a design patent, see 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1958) ; Bliss-
craft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1961);
Burgess Vibrocrafters, Inc. v. Atkins Indus., Inc., 204 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1953), or
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scriptive 7 1 features are set apart from the public domain in the first
instance by courts, without such an administrative scrutiny, there is a
serious risk that the public will part with the competitive quo without
being assured an adequate quid for consideration. Moreover, the
grant resulting from a successful unfair competition action is perpetual,
whereas the patent or copyright grant persists only for a limited term.
Thus the dangers inherent in allowing unfair competition relief to be
applied with respect to functional and descriptive elements, although
not necessarily determinative of the issues, are clear. When no other
public interest factor, such as that in preventing public deception, has
been cast into the balance against the possible damage to the free
enterprise system, courts have traditionally refused to forbid copying
of functional or descriptive innovative elements.7' Under the mis-
appropriation theory, however, a different result may be reached.73
Category 7 represents perhaps the most frequently litigated situa-
tion-the copyist who appropriates a functional feature of the in-
novator's product. The leading case in this area is Crescent Tool Co.
v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.,7' involving the copying of the plaintiff's new
and popular, but unpatented, "Crescent" wrench design. The plaintiff
invoked the aid of the courts to protect the market that he had made
or found against poaching by his rival, but he was not successful.
Analogizing the distinctive appearance of the article to the descriptive
a copyright In the latter case, scrutiny is not intensive. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 11, 207-09
(1958); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
Unlike esthetic functionality, for examples of which see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954); Trifairi, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), non-esthetic functionality is not protectable in the name of copy-
right. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (accounting system); Brown Instru-
ment Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947)
(chart not "writing" because it does not convey ideas) ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v.
Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936) ("Bank Night" concept not copyrightable).
But cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356 (1908) (map). The rationale
is essentially that the particular form of expression of the non-esthetic functionality
involved is not what the "author" really seeks to protect-he seeks to protect the
abstract idea instead, and this is outside the scope of "writings." See Mazer v. Stein,
supra at 217.
The roles of patent and copyright in the protection of configurations of goods
are compared generally in ScHvARTz, FREE ENTERPRISE AND EcONOMIC ORGANIZATION
638-41 (2d ed. 1959).
71 Descriptiveness as such will not be protected by patent or copyright. It may
receive incidental protection, however, to the extent that a descriptive package or
emblem may be the subject of a copyright or design patent. Cf. Lucien Lelong, Inc
v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1947) (denying protection after expiration of
design patent to bottle shape which may have become generic or descriptive for
cologne).
72 E.g., Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Contonniere v. Alexander's Dep't Stores,
Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962); see, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,
35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930) ; Chafee, Unfair Coin-
petition, 53 fAfv. L. REV. 1289, 1317-18 (1940).
73 But cf. Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown, 55 HARV. L. REV.
595, 612-14 (1942).
74 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
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title in certain trade name cases,75 judge Learned Hand, speaking for
the court, declared that the innovator could be protected against com-
petition by the copyist only if the public had come to believe that Cres-
cent wrenches came from a common source (which, of course, need not
be individually known), and if they bought them because they wanted
the goods that came from that source and no other. Since the "critical
question of fact at the outset . . .whether the public is moved in any
degree to buy the article because of its source" 76 was not established
by plaintiff, relief was denied. Because the innovator failed to carry
his proof far enough to establish that the design had acquired a sec-
ondary meaning, the court never even reached the question of "fair
warning" versus deception (the copyist had clearly labelled his product
as his own).
A more recent Second Circuit decision on copying functional
features is Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, I1C.,7 7 involving
"Pepto-Bismol," the innovating stomach remedy, and "Pepsamar," the
75 See text accompanying note 12 supra. A distinction which might be urged
between these cases and the Crescent Tool type of case is that the former typically
involved words that had acquired their primary meaning in the public domain
("Glenfield' as a geographical designation, "camel hair" as the term applied to the
hair of that beast), and then later acquired their secondary meaning, if any, after the
plaintiff had appropriated the term to himself when applied in his particular context;
in the Crescent Tool situation, however, the appearance of the product involved or
its functional element is new and was not previously used in the public domain. But
this distinction does not withstand closer scrutiny.
If the innovation is novel, in the sense that it did not previously exist in others'
products, and yet the innovator elected to secure no patent, we believe that lack of
patentability may be presumed. (In the alternative, the innovator elected to abandon
his invention to the public. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 423-24 (1891) ;
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 22 (1829).) Bare novelty, however useful,
is insufficient to warrant a patent. The alleged invention must also not be "obvious,"
see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958), which is to say it may not be the solution to the problem
that other people skilled in the art might reasonably be expected to devise. See
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Cuno
Engineering Co. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90 (1941) ; Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850). In short, absence of prior "exist-
ence" is not enough to warrant suspension of the rules of our competitive system;
the claimed innovation must further not have previously "subsisted" or have been
immanent in the art. For this reason, it cannot be premised that some novel functional
element was not in the public domain merely because it was not already in use. Thus
in Crescent Tool Judge Hand observed, "It will not be enough only to show how
pleasing they [crescent wrenches] are, because all the features of beauty or utility
that commend them to the public are by hypothesis already in the public domain."
247 Fed. at 300.
Taking a word with one currency in the public domain and giving it a novel
application, and hence a different or secondary currency, is not materially different
from taking a common mechanical principle and applying it in a new way or taking a
common design and applying it to the configuration of one's product. If, in either
context, therefore, something more than the act of appropriation by the first comer is
necessary to validate his claim to exclusive rights, the necessity is equal in both. Nor
do we think any useful distinction between functionality and descriptiveness can be
drawn on a premise that we enjoy a comparative wealth of words and a poverty of
utilitarian product designs, thus warranting the recognition of different standards
in the two fields.
76 247 Fed. at 300.
77271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
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nostrum which copied it. The innovator claimed that his rival had no
right to copy the pink color of the product, but the court held that pink
soothed the sensibilities of the suffering user and decreased the likeli-
hood of his regurgitating the product. A finding of functionality
would appear in order, the court reasoned, "because a rejected stomach
medicine scarcely has a fair opportunity to fulfill its function." 78 The
Pepto-Bismol case also involves category 6, since the court found that
the "pep" common to "Pepto-Bismol" and "Pepsamar" was "an apoco-
pate form of 'peptic,' pertaining to digestion," and generic for stomach
remedies.7" Since secondary meaning for neither copied element had
been established by the innovator, relief was denied."
A more unusual example of descriptiveness in category 6 was
presented in Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co.,3' where
the copied trademark "Uncle Sam" was descriptive for the copyist's
product but not for the first user's. Plaintiff owned the registered
trademark "Uncle Sam" for toy banks and put it on a "quality" line
of various-shaped banks retailing at prices up to $2.50 and covered by
a lifetime guarantee. When defendant brought out a rudely made, tin,
ten-cent toy bank, labelled "Uncle Sam Bank," shaped like a top hat,
and painted red, white, and blue, the senior user of the mark brought
78 271 F.2d at 572.
79 Id. at 573.
so The court's analysis in the Pepto-Bismol case is more troublesome than the
text indicates. While the result reached, and much of the reasoning, reflected the
traditional, "public injury"-oriented conception of unfair competition law, some at-
tempt was made to defer to the newer view which had gained acceptance in New York
law. See notes 29-31 supra, 140-49 infra and accompanying text. In an effort to
dissipate misunderstanding which had grown up about the essential elements of an
unfair competition cause of action without secondary meaning, the court sought to
rationalize the newer view and distinguish prior cases in terms of categories of
"predatory practices," viz., "palming off," "actual deception," and "appropriation of
another's property." See 271 F.2d at 571.
We do not believe that this analysis, however ingenious, is wholly satisfactory.
For example, one of the court's new predatory categories, "palming off," is a well-
known term of art in unfair competition law, see 3 RESTA=ENT, TORTS 539 (1938),
which refers precisely to the traditional conception of unfair competition embodying
the requirement of secondary meaning (as exemplified by the Crescent Tool case).
See Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1959)
(using "palming off" in the traditional sense three days earlier). But see Note, 70
YALE L.J. 406, 428-29 (1961) (missing the point). Moreover, the distinction between
"palming off" and "actual deception" is, at best, tenuous. Finally, the court's attempt
to fit the line of misappropriation cases into the three categories appears to strain for
distinctions based on fairly casual elements of the fact situations, although, to be
sure, it does have the virtue of disposing of the cases.
The court's technique thus disguises, without resolving, the public injury-private
wrong conflict whose disruptive effect on New York law it felt so keenly. The
inadequacies of the approach would seem largely due to the unsusceptibility of the
New York law to satisfactory rationalization. See text accompanying notes 148-50
infra. Supporters of the misappropriation doctrine are also critical of the analysis
in Pepto-Bismol. See Derenberg, The Thirteenth Year of Administration of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 845-46 (1960) ; Note, 70
YALE LJ. 406, 428-29 (1961).
81 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943).
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an action for an injunction and damages. On appeal from a favorable
verdict for the innovator, the Second Circuit reversed, per Learned
Hand:
There is no basis for the assumption that anyone who
bought one of the defendants' banks would be led to do so
because he supposed that the plaintiff was its source . ..
There is no reason to believe that anyone who bought the de-
fendants' tawdry little gadget . . . has ever supposed that
"Uncle Sam's" meant the plaintiff, or that it signified to him
any single source whatever. Moreover, even if he had so
supposed, there is not the slightest reason to think that it
would have had any influence in determining him to buy;
and every reason to believe that it would not. Such cheap
trifles are bought on their face, so to say: for what they seem
to be. Those who buy them care nothing who makes
them . 8.2..
For the plaintiff, "Uncle Sam" was used merely "to throw about
its banks a vague implication of solidity," and to appropriate whatever
advantage there may be in exploiting the national mythology set about
the patriotic symbol.' But for defendant, the red, white, and blue top
hat was very aptly described by "Uncle Sam." The court did not deem
it necessary to balance the descriptivity to the copyist against the
property right claims ' of the senior user, however, for it simply de-
nied that he had any "right," for want of secondary meaning in the
mark.85
The celebrated litigation between Superman and Captain Mar-
vel8 6 furnishes an interesting example of category 5. Whiz Comics
had taken Action Comics' character "Superman," put red tights on him
in place of blue tights, changed his red cape for a yellow one, replaced
the letter "S" on his chest medallion with a bolt of lightning, and then
renamed him "Captain Marvel." That defendant imitated plaintiff by
putting a benevolent Hercules figure into comic strip form was clearly
821d. at 854.
83 Id. at 855.
84 See id. at 854.
85 Accord, Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithographing Co.,
142 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944) (descriptive mark
under ten-year clause of Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 725). See also
Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1942); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v.
Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 144 F. Supp. 112, 121-22, 128 (D.N.J. 1956), aft'd, 247 F.2d
730 (3d Cir. 1957). Compare Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere v. Alex-
ander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (Zd Cir. 1962), permitting the copyist to
label his dresses as copies of Dior models, which they were. Descriptive use of the
Dior trademark had considerable influence, unlike the use of "Uncle Sam," in moti-
vating the customers to buy; but, like the buyers of the imitation Atmos clock, see
text following note 50 supra, the dress buyers knew what they were doing.
8 6 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594
(2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.).
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not unfair competition, since the figure is a stock character long since in
the public domain. The costume of plaintiff's character, however-the
set of tights, cape, chest medallion-is a trademark of sorts, or at
least a distinctive configuration of goods.8 7 To the extent that this
costume has become descriptive for comic strip figures of this class, the
public interest in facilitating consumer recognition of the goods would
strongly suggest that it be kept free to all comers (Wonder Woman,
Mighty Mouse, et al.) Y8 Again, to the extent that the costume is
part of what makes the strips attractive, the Superman uniform is
functional and should be kept in the public domain.
Without reaching these questions of public policy, however, the
court found the claim of unfair competition baseless for want of sec-
ondary meaning. No balancing of interests was necessary because the
public interest in preventing buyer deception was not involved. A
determination of likelihood of public deception would have required,
as we have seen from Crescent Tool, secondary meaning in the Super-
man uniform-that the uniform had become associated with the in-
novator as the source and that this association provided an induce-
ment for buyers to deal with him. But "in the case of these silly
pictures," as the court characterized them, "nobody cares who is the
producer." " The pictures sold because they were functional-they
amused and pleased-and this was, as Judge Hand put it, because of
"what they are, not because they come from [the plaintiff] . ... ,
In these circumstances, therefore, the innovator asserted no claim
which should call the power of the state into action on his behalf.
The application of the misappropriation theory to cases in these
categories is illustrated by Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co.,91 a case
involving facts quite similar to those in Crescent Tool. Plaintiff had
invented, but neither copyrighted nor patented, a locket composed of a
mustard seed encased in clear plastic. The locket was supposed to
remind its wearer of the Biblical passage concerning the power of "so
much faith as a grain of mustard" to move mountainsg2 This
"Mustard Seed Remembrancer" was copied by defendant, who
marketed "Your Mustard Seed Charm." Despite the obvious func-
87 To be sure, no technical trademark is involved, for want of affixation to the
goods. See Gray v. Armand Co., 24 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1928). But cf. Lanham
Act § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1958) (mark used in commerce).
Again, just what 'the goods" are, the comic book or the character, to which the mark
should be affixed, is problematical.
8 8But see Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d
Cir. 1940) ("Wonderman" infringes copyright on Superman's costume and feats).
89 191 F.2d at 603.
90 Ibid.
91 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
92 Matt. 17:20.
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tionality of the locket, and the descriptiveness of its name and of the
accompanying literature, the court enjoined the activities of the copyist,
holding that secondary meaning was no longer an essential element of
unfair competition in New York. The decision was not appealed from
the district court to the court of appeals, where perhaps it might have
fallen to Judge Hand to write the opinion for the court. Clearly, it
would have been hard to accommodate the result in Flint93 to the
philosophy and language of the Chein " and Superman " cases. By
the same token, however, a true believer in the misappropriation doc-
trine would probably reach the opposite result in every one of the
cases discussed in the last several pages. 6  Thus, in the Atmos and
Notre Dame cases, which fall within these categories of our classifica-
tion, the courts readily bypassed the public interest considerations pro-
tected in the Hand decisions when they collided with the private
interests of innovators.
2. The Neutral Case
Different considerations might be thought to apply to the eighth
category, the "neutral case," in which the copied element is neither
functional nor descriptive, nor has it acquired a secondary meaning.
The case for protecting the innovator against copying despite the ab-
sence of secondary meaning can be made out most strongly here, since
the affirmative public interest in keeping the area free is not obvious.
But the traditional view-that the burden of persuasion is not on the
copyist, since the presumption in favor of free competition is on his
side, but on the innovator who must persuade the court to validate his
claims-has, we submit, more to recommend it. According to the
philosophy of the "public injury" rule, which we advocate, the courts
should not interfere in private controversies in which one trader seeks
to control the marketing of another unless the interference is calculated
to further the interest of the public at large. In the neutral case, then,
the state should leave the parties where the free marketplace leaves
them.
93 An additional element involved in Flint was the copyist's false and perhaps
deceptive assertion that he had originated the locket. Although the district court
specifically relied upon the New York misappropriation law, the case has been dis-
tinguished on the basis of presence of deception, apparently on the theory that Flint
deserves to be restricted to its facts. See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug
Co., 271 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) ; cf. Speedry
Prods., Inc. v. Dri Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646, 650 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1959). But
see text accompanying note 139 infra. See also American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman,
275 F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1960).
94 See text accompanying note 82 supra.
95 See text accompanying note 89 supra.




Our basic reason for this position is the belief that state inaction
is to be preferred to state action when all other things are equal
(whether equal in fact because public interests are equipoised on either
side or equal by default because there is not sufficient information to
support an informed opinion). It is recognized that public conse-
quences flow from withholding state action just as they do from af-
firmatively exercising state power. But we think that the possible
collateral results 9 of affirmative action by the state dictate a policy of
judicial self-restraint and tip the balance in otherwise neutral cases
toward inaction." By the same token, we prefer a wider diffusion of
the power to make decisions, or a maximization of the exercise of in-
dividual volition 9  And, as between the many businessmen and the
few courts, we prefer to spread the responsibility out among the former
unless a convincing case is made for the latter to step in.
Cases in the eighth category are infrequent, for the copyist seldom
copies without some reason-taking advantage either of the func-
tionality of the innovator's product or of its secondary meaning. More
frequently, however, courts refer to category 8 in dictum in the course
of a decision in a category 7 case. Thus in Crescent Tool Judge
Hand observed, in passing, "The defendant has as much right to copy
the 'nonfunctional' features of the article as any others, so long as
they have not become associated with the plaintiff as manufacturer or
source." 10o
The recent "sponge mop" case, American-Marietta Co. v. Krigs-
man,'0 ' does illustrate this category, however, as well as suggest some
97 In this respect we place particular importance on the "right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," referred
to in the dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928). See also the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., in Public Util. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952). We believe with Mr. Justice Holmes that "the
most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own
way, unless the ground for interference is very dear," Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (dissenting opinion), rather than with
Callmann that "to justify any regulation of competition, it need not be shown that it is
positively advantageous to the public, but only that the public is not harmed thereby,"
note 73 supra, at 599. Compare KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFoRm 369 (1947) ; Kessler,
supra note 46, at 167, quoted infra in text accompanying note 156.
98 See generally HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 218 (1960) ; WALLIcH,
THE COST OF FREEDOm 62-63, 71-73 (1960). By analogy, we have the familiar dis-
tinction between negative and affirmative acts. Although the lack of logical distinction
between a promise and the absence of the contrary promise may be demonstrated, see
Stone, Burden of Proof and the Jdicial Process, 60 L.Q. REv. 262, 280-81 (1944), we
think all lawyers recognize a pragmatic distinction between ordering someone to do
something and ordering him to refrain from doing something, a distinction based
essentially on what constitutes disturbing the status quo.
99 See BREWSTER, THE CORPORATION AND EcONOMIC FEDERALISM 75-76 (1959);
KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 53-54 (1947).
100 247 Fed. at 300.
101275 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960), modifying 170 F. Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1959),
modifying 168 F. Supp. 645 (1958).
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of the practical consequences of the allocation of the burden of proof
in these cases. After the patent on the sponge mop which has largely
replaced the old-fashioned string mop was invalidated, the former
licensee attempted to secure protection in the name of unfair competi-
tion.1"2 But protection of the functional features of the novel mop was
not sought; plaintiff attempted only to prevent the copying of the non-
functional arrangement of slots in the metal "presser plate" (hinged to
the bottom of the mop) which is pressed against the sponge to squeeze
water out. Nevertheless, the preliminary injunction was denied. The
rule against nonfunctional copying, the court of appeals held (speaking
through Judge Hand), is restricted to cases where the nonfunctional
element has acquired a secondary meaning:
• * * It is indeed quite likely that buyers have assumed an
identity of origin to the two mops from their general similar-
ity; it is even possible-though we should suppose it very un-
likely-that the identical form of the "slots" may have con-
tributed to that assumption, but one who seeks to enjoin
the reproduction of what is in the public domain must af-
firmatively show that the copied features were the reason
for the confusion; it is not enough that perhaps it may have
contributed .... 103
The practical consequence of placing on the innovator the burden
of bringing forward persuasive evidence of secondary meaning, im-
posing on the copyist no burden of showing functionality or descrip-
tiveness until the innovator has made out his part of the case, is evi-
dent. Often neither party can prove anything,"0 4 and the allocation
of burden of proof in category 8 is, and in categories 5-7 often is,105
102 Plaintiff had been the domestic licensee of the patent during its period of appar-
ent validity, from 1949 to 1957. When plaintiff terminated its license arrangement
in 1957 because of the invalidation, the inventor began selling the component parts of
the mop to defendant, who assembled and marketed the product. 168 F. Supp. at 647.
Plaintiff then sued to protect the flourishing market it had built up in the United States
for the sponge mop by "extensive advertising and efficient sales methods." 170 F.
Supp. at 772.
103 275 F.2d at 290.
104 See McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 322, at 686 (1954). The classic example of this is
Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188 (1821). See also Holden v. Bloom, 314 Mass. 309, 50
N.E.2d 193 (1943); Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960);
Winans v. Attorney General, [1904] A.C. 287, 289; Munro, Brice & Co. v. War
Risks Ass'n, [1918] 2 K.B. 78; In re Aldersey, [1905] 2 Ch. 181, 187-88. See gen-
erally FuLLR, BAsIC CoNTRAcT LAW 767-68, 770 (1947).
105Thus, in Crescent Tool (in category 7), in Chein (in category 6), and in
Superman (probably in category 5), the court never reached functionality or descrip-
tiveness (although functionality was presumed in Crescent Tool and, apparently, in
Superman) because the plaintiff never proved "the absolute condition to any relief
whatever." 247 Fed. at 300. To be sure, descriptiveness or functionality can be
proved, as in DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936) ("cellophane" descriptive or generic for cellulose
film), but it is much more common to let it be assumed, as with pinkness of Pepto-
Bismol, whereupon the case goes off on plaintiff's failure to make out his affirmative
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determinative of the issues."0 6 This determination, however, is fully
consistent with the policy considerations outlined previously, for it
gives functionality the benefit of the doubt and minimizes the incidence
of state action. And allocation of the burden of proof, like adoption of
presumptions, is a familiar means of expressing policies."0 7
C. Cases Involving Competing Values
Categories 1 through 3 present the greatest difficulties in analysis.
Here, the public interest in preventing consumer deception and the
interest in freeing descriptive and functional features clash; the ease
of balancing something against nothing, found in category 4 and
categories 5-7, is absent. The short answer to the problem is to take
refuge in a case-by-case analysis, by means of which the solution ap-
propriate to each peculiar set of facts is developed."0 This approach
leaves unstated, however, the standards for making the comparison-
and therefore, as some may view it, leaves too much room for individ-
ual caprice ' 9 and too much uncertainty for the businessmen affected." 0
Moreover, hard cases like these, where all the operative factors are
involved, and compete for primacy, test the validity of the doctrines
case on secondary meaning. We suspect that some of these category 5-7 cases might
have gone the other way if plaintiff had met his burden of showing some secondary
meaning and thus turned them into category 1-3 cases.106 See Chas. D. Bridell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 421-22
(2d Cir. 1952) (dissent protests readiness of majority to take judicial notice of ab-
sence of secondary meaning and concludes that almost nothing could make them
believe secondary meaning existed) ; Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d
969, 976-77 & nn.6, 7 & 7a (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion). In addition to the
absolute difficulties of proof, say, of secondary meaning, the cost of bringing evidence
forward may be very substantial. Compare the cost-justification problem under the
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), dis-
cussed in ATr'Y GEN. NA'L Comm. ANTITUSTR xe. 172-74 (1955) ("only the most
prosperous and patient business firm could afford pursuit of an often illusory defense") ;
Austern, TaInda it Naufragio-Adininistrative Style, in 1953 ANTITRUST SY-MosrUM
105, 115 (available only to "the wealthy, the resourceful and the tireless").
07See Stone, supra note 98.
108 Another short answer is to treat secondary meaning as the ultimate fact rather
than an evidentiary (or at least subsidiary) fact, subsuming and concealing the whole
analysis in the determination of secondary meaning vel non. See Midwest Plastics
Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., 285 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Upjohn Co. V.
Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1957) ; J. R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods.
Co., 219 F.2d 313, 320 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp.
861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957). It would appear clear that a feature of a product can play
a role in its operation and at the same time identify its source. See, e.g., William
Edge & Sons v. William Niccolls & Sons, [1911] A.C. 693. But courts usually deny
that a functional feature can operate as a trademark. See, e.g., United States Ply-
wood Corp. v. Watson, 171 F. Supp. 193 (D.D.C. 1958); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc.
v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1957) (alternative holding).
Compare with the foregoing cases the far more carefully articulated analysis of Appli-
cation of Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500, 503-04 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
10 9 For the view that case-by-case analysis (in an antitrust law context) may
readily degenerate into no analysis at all, see Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract,
and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 66 n.295 (1959). See also Levi, Mergers,
in CONFERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Cotmr. AIrTI-
TRUST REP. 69, 77 (Rahl & Zaidins ed. 1955).
110 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 358 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring).
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applied in situations in which the difficulties of analysis are less tax-
ing.11 Refusal to face the problems of balancing the competing poli-
cies and values at stake in such cases amounts to abdication of the
judicial function. Both the business community and the general public
are entitled to overt, articulated analysis of the lawmaking process."
The courts have escaped from the pitfalls of the short answer by
singling out a further pair of operative facts to be considered in cases
involving the copying of features which both possess secondary mean-
ing and are functional or descriptive. These are whether a fair warn-
ing to the purchaser is feasible, and whether it is provided. When fair
warning is given the buyer, copying is allowed." 3 When the warning is
feasible and is not given, the copying is deemed impermissible. When
the warning is not feasible, however, the necessity of balancing com-
peting values again becomes acute. The solution proposed in the
Restatement for such cases is not to balance values in each case as it
arises, but to strike an a priori balance with the public interest in un-
fettered competition given a preferred position." 4 The few English
cases take an opposite view." 5
The "fair warning" rule has been applied by the courts in de-
scriptiveness and functionality cases alike. In DuPont Cellophane
Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.," 6 the court faced the problem of deter-
mining what degree of protection should be given to the trademark
"Cellophane" after it had become generic for cellulose film. Despite
the fact that the term was now descriptive, it still retained some
secondary meaning, at least to some buyers. Hence the relief given
the innovator was to require the rival Sylvania to refer to his product
as "Sylvania's cellophane." 17 In Modern Aids, Inc. v. R. H. Macy
M' See Corbin, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE LJ. 78 (1923).
112 See Kessler, Arthur Linton Corbin--A Tribute, 64 YAIE L.J. 164, 166 (1954).
1130 One may regard the warning as a device to negate source-identification-in
which case the presence of "fair warning" would be deemed to shift cases in categories
1-3 into 5-7. The writers believe it more helpful to consider this matter apart from
the question of whether the copied element is source-identificatory, rather than assimi-
lating it to the complex judgment of secondary meaning. The source-identificatory
and functional (or descriptive) element may well, for example, be distinct from the
manner of warning. Thus, the body design of the Atmos clock might be copied, but
the carton and the dial face labelled "made by Mastercrafters, who have no connection
with Atmos.'
114 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 741(b) (ii), comment i (1938).
115 See text accompanying notes 128-35 infra.
11685 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936).
117 The solution in G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (6th Cir.
1912), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1916), was similar. The text of Noah Webster's
dictionary had passed into the public domain after the copyright had expired, and the
original publisher was faced by a rival. The court permitted the copyist to term his
dictionary a "Webster's," since it indeed was Noah's product, but the newcomer was
required to state that he was not the "original" publisher. The general principle has
elsewhere been expressed: "[T]he explanation must accompany the use, so as to give
the antidote with the bane." Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208
U.S. 554, 559 (1908). But cf. Reddaway v. Banham, [1896] AC. 199; Montgomery




& Co.,""8 the defendant had copied plaintiff's massage machine. The
district court enjoined the copyist from selling the machine or any
similar machine. But the court of appeals reversed, since defendant
was free to imitate plaintiff's machine "as closely as it chose," unless
(1) the configuration of the machine had acquired a secondary mean-
ing implying the innovator as the source, and (2) this source, rather
than the machine itself, was what moved purchasers to buy. "Even
then, however," the court held, "relief would go no further than to
require the defendant to make plain to buyers that the plaintiff was not
the source .... " 119
The more difficult problem is posed by the case where adequate
source warning is not commercially feasible, and therefore is not given.
The conflict between the public interest in freeing descriptive or func-
tional features conflicts directly with the public interest in preventing
consumer deception. The copyist, of course, champions the former
value; the innovator asserts the latter. One solution would be to at-
tempt to measure and compare the two interests. We have already
alluded to the difficulties of this approach; although they may not be
insurmountable, they certainly make this solution infelicitous.'
Another, and ideal, solution would be to find one or more addi-
tional operative facts to bring into the analysis to eliminate further
necessity for case-by-case balancing, just as the introduction of the
concept of "warning" helped to do at the immediately prior stage of
analysis. Unfortunately, no one has come up with such helpful addi-
tional categories for schematizing this sector of unfair competition
law. Moreover, addition of another category or two would probably
only push the case-by-case balancing a little further away, rather than
eliminate it. In the end one must, we suspect, choose between one
type of fiat or another-the balancing of the equities, subject to no re-
view but for abuse of discretion, or the a priori choice of one value as
always prime-to put an end to the infinite regress from the element
of choice. 2'
The leading case here is Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey
Cornell Co.,' a suit between the innovator of shredded wheat and a
118 264 F2d 93 (2d Cir. 1959).
119 Id. at 94.
120 It should be noted, however, that when the area of balancing intangibles is
narrowed to this degree, the unpalatableness of this resort is correspondingly lessened.
121 Cf. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.
L. Rv. 473, 505 (1962). Moreover, the practice of adding more concepts, like epi-
cycles to a Ptolmaic system to shore it up must eventually be discarded and a Coperni-
can system adopted instead. The policy of Occam's Razor-terminological parsimony
-is sound. The more legal concepts that are involved in the analysis, the more con-
fusion and likelihood of contradictions.
122 250 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).
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copyist. The evidence was uncontradicted that the innovator's
shredded wheat biscuit had acquired a secondary meaning. But when
restaurants and boarding houses served the biscuits in cereal bowls to
diners there was no way for the patrons to be sure they were getting
the "original" shredded wheat, if they cared (as, indeed, some did)
from what source their breakfast emanated. Although it was
"physically possible" to affix a distinguishing feature to the new-
comer's biscuit that would apprise purchasers of the source, the prac-
ticality of such measures was doubtful. To bake the biscuit a darker
brown, or else make it rawer and thus lighter in hue, would render it
"repellent to most tastes." To enlarge the biscuit would make it too
big to put in a cereal bowl; to make it smaller, so three biscuits would
be eaten instead of the present two, would substantially increase manu-
facturing costs. It was suggested that the biscuit itself could have a
mark impressed into it or a label pasted on it, but the feasibility of
such devices was uncertain. In an effort to adjust the competing in-
terests, the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Learned Hand,
required the copyist to attempt to put some kind of warning on his
biscuits during a six-month probationary period. At the end of that
time, the copyist was to be relieved of the restriction if he showed that
it made impossible his continued competition with "an assurance of
reasonable profit."
The Restatement takes a similar position, but appears to employ a
standard of reasonable feasibility somewhat more tolerant to the copy-
ist. It requires the copyist of functional features with secondary mean-
ing to take "reasonable steps to inform prospective purchasers that the
goods which he markets are not those of the other." 12 Those steps
which "would involve a financial expenditure which would substantially
hinder competition" or "cannot be taken as a practical matter" are not
deemed "reasonable." 124 This view appears to be based on the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Brandeis in a later shredded wheat case, Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co.," in which the Court relieved the copyist
Kellogg of any burden to distinguish its biscuits from the "originals."
The copyist was held not to be obliged "to insure that every purchaser
will know it to be the maker but to use every reasonable means to
prevent confusion." '26
1 2 3 RESTATEmEIT, ToRTs § 741(b) (ii) (1938).
124Id., comment j.
125 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
126 Id. at 121. Among the facts which the Court deemed relevant in finding that
no further steps by the copyist were reasonably required were that the copied biscuits
were % the size of the original, that 232% of Kellogg's sales were to restaurants, and
that, of this 2%%, some 98% of it was sold in labelled, individual-serving cartons.
Moreover, the cost of changing from the functional, pillow-shaped biscuit to another
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A contrasting solution to the problem was reached in some Eng-
lish cases. These appear to emphasize the comparison of the "equi-
table rights of rival traders" to the exclusion of other factors, thus
foreshadowing the American "misappropriation" doctrine.n
7
In Monztgomery v. Thompson,2 the first comer had operated
the only brewery in Stone for over a century, and "Stone ales" had
achieved a national reputation for quality. According to the new-
comer, only the peculiar virtue and chemical qualities of Stone's waters
had attracted him to that town as a brewery site. Although the court
recognized that some degree of description was involved, and several
lords expressed reservations about the breadth of the lower court's
injunction against use of "Stone," the innovator's claims were upheld.
As for the copyist's contention that he should be permitted to sell
"Stone ale" with a notice on the label that it did not emanate from
the plaintiff, Lord MacNaghten doubted the effectiveness of any warn-
ing in the circumstances of the case: "Thirsty folk want beer, not ex-
planations. If the public get the thing they want, or something near
it, and get it under the old name-the name with which they are
familiar-they are likely to be supremely indifferent to the character
and conduct of the brewer and the equitable rights of rival traders." "
In Reddaway v. Banham,"3' the court forbade a copyist to label
his machinery belts "camel hair belting," even though it turned out in
the course of trial (as no one in the trade had suspected) that camel hair
was a principal constituent of the raw materials. No one really cared,
however, what the belts actually contained, and other manufacturers
indifferently labelled their belting "Buffalo," "Crocodile," "Yak,"
"Gnu," or whatever animal, hairy or hairless, took their fancy. It was
clear to the court that no warning would be effective (many buyers did
not speak English) and that the only effect of permitting the copyist
to use the (technically) descriptive phrase would be to allow him to
form would be significant. Id. at 121-22. Among the considerations which would
generally enter the determination of whether a warning requirement was feasible are
"the interest of the public in the advances of technical progress and economic com-
petition, the degree of similarity in the rival products, the alternate means of pro-
duction available, the nature and cost of the product, the type of customers generally
involved, and the negotiations and care usually employed prior to maldng a purchase."
American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 274-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 915 (1959).
127A similar solution is referred to in Note, 70 YALE L.J. 406, 436-37 (1961)
-requiring that the rival manufacturers' products be distinguished, even if this means
that the newcomer must not use functional or descriptive features.
128 [1891] A.C. 217.
329 Id. at 225. The reader is invited to speculate how the Stone ale opinion
would have been written by Judge Learned Hand, particularly with reference to the
degree of protection appropriate for a manufacturer to whom (or to whose "equitable
rights") his patrons are "supremely indifferent" so long as they get "something near"
his product.
13o [18961 A.C. 199.
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deceive the first corner's customers, to whom "camel hair" had the
secondary meaning that Reddaway was the source of the goods, and
to whom the copyist had given no "fair warning." '
In the more recent Spanish Champagne case, Bollinger v. Costa
Brava Wine Co.,'"2 twelve of the great French champagne houses
brought an action to enjoin the defendant from selling Spanish
sparkling wine (known in Spain as "perelada") under the label "Span-
ish Champagne." There was a suggestion at trial that the bride's
mother would be more concerned with spending money on the trous-
seau than on the wine, and would therefore take advantage of the fact
that her guests would not inquire too closely into the origin of what
they were drinking.3 Fearing that the guests would be too thirsty, or
would otherwise lack the opportunity,134 to question what they were
being served, or, in Lord MacNaghten's words, to weigh "the equitable
rights of rival traders," the High Court entered an injunction ban-
ning the use of the word "champagne" on the perelada label.'3 3 There
was no discussion of the feasibility of giving fair warning or whether
in fact it was given by the use of the prefix "Spanish." For the sake
of discussion, we assume here that fair warning was not given and (as
in Stone ale) was not feasible.
In at least the first two English cases, the facts are distinguishable
from the American cases, in that the descriptiveness was deemed slight
or even accidental, whereas the secondary meaning was substantial.
Assuming that premise, the impairment of the public interest by the
grant of protection appears insignificant. The Spanish Champagne
case, however, raises more questions. In this country, all sparkling
white wines are called champagnes, and we venture to suggest that if
they were not, few buyers would know what they were.136  To be sure,
1
3
1 Id. at 221-22.
132 [1961] 1 Weekly L.R. 277 (Ch. 1960). See also the interlocutory decree on
demurrer, [1960] Ch. 262 (1959).
133 See the remarks of A. G. Guest during a broadcast on the Third Programme,
summarized in A Case of Champagne, 65 THE LISTENER 927, 930 (1961).
134 Compare G. H. Mumm Champagne Co. v. Eastern Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944), in which Judge Hand recognized the
propensity of unscrupulous restaurateurs to furnish a cheap grade of champagne to
patrons well in their cups and thus unable to distinguish what they were drinking
(defendant's wine) from what they were paying for (plaintiff's).
135 Compare RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 720 (a) (1938). See also Whitstable Fish-
ery Co. v. Hayling Fisheries, Ltd., 17 R. Pat. Cas. 461 (1900); Free Fishers &
Dredgers of Whitstable v. Elliott, 4 T.L.R. 273 (Ch. 1888), both distinguished in the
principal case.
136 See 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.21 (b)2-3, 4.25 (1961) (Internal Revenue Service regu-
lations under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act allowing domestic sparkling
white wine to be labelled "champagne" in specified circumstances). Compare S. Con.
Res. 35, H.R. Con. Res. 356, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (favoring exclusion from
the United States of foreign liquor labelled "bourbon"); 107 CONG. REc. A2383
(1961) (remarks of Rep. Watts of Kentucky to the same effect).
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the High Court specifically found that, in England, Champagne had
not met the fate of other wines such as Burgundy, Sherry, Hock,
whose names have lost their initial capital letters and have become
generic for a class of wines.13 Nevertheless, a word may be descrip-
tive without having become generic. In a practical sense, there is
hardly any other appellation to give perelada but "champagne" if the
seller is to succeed in communicating to non-U buyers what is in his
bottles; we question whether "sparkling white wine" would convey
much meaning to the brides' mothers whom Costa Brava was attempt-
ing to reach. Denying the perelada seller the privilege of describing
his wares in terms of "champagne" effectively prevents his competi-
tion. Finally, as for the mother's passing perelada off as champagne
to her guests, considerations that we have discussed in connection with
the Atmos Clock case would suggest that she should be allowed to do
her worst.
Perhaps something substantial is lost by not balancing the con-
flicting public interests with one another to maximize the total public
good-particularly in cases like the Camel Hair case, where descrip-
tiveness is slight. But as a concession to the shortness of life and the
institutional capacity or incapacity of courts, we believe the solution
of the Restatement and the American decisions it follows is to be pre-
ferred to that of the English courts. There is another reason for this
view, less technical and more conjectural, but probably given con-
siderable weight in the American decisions. This is the public injury
doctrine that unfair competition law exists to protect the public qua
consumer. 138 When this is coupled with the premise that it is in-
herently more probable that the public harm from weakened competi-
tion will exceed the public harm from deception' 39 (perhaps a con-
137 While the court in the Spanish Champagnw case found that "champagne" was
not generic for sparkling white wine in England, [1961] 1 Weekly L.R. at 286, no
finding of secondary meaning in our sense of the term was made.
138 See SmITH, WEALTH OF NATIoNs 625 (Modern Library ed. 1937): "Con-
sumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer
ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the
consumer." Judge Frank has characterized as fundamental to laissez-faire juris-
prudence the assumption that "where the economic interest of consumers conflicted
with the economic interest of the [commercial] competitor, only the consumer interest
was judicially considered." Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40 (2d
Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion). See also Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere
v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962); American Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959),
discussed in note 158 infra.
139 See text accompanying note 107 supra. For a carefully articulated, uncom-
promising exposition of this view, see Application of Deister Concentration Co., 289
F.2d 496, 503-04 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Although the point in issue was whether a functional
mark (mark consisting of functional configuration of surface of ore processing table)
could be registered under § 2(f) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 428, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (1958) (marks distinctive of applicant's goods), the court essayed an
extended analysis of the status of functional configurations of goods in trademark
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jectural premise, to be sure), it follows that the newcomer should be
permitted to imitate the functional or descriptive feature of the in-
novator's product even when fair warning is not feasible. Moreover,
for whatever it is worth, the previously discussed policy of reluctance
to permit any state action except upon a clear showing of public benefit
weighs against court intervention in such cases.
The entire foregoing discussion may be summarized with respect
to the schematization of the cases presented in Table I. Thus, with
respect to categories 5-8, the copying is lawful, whereas, with respect
to category 4, it is not. It is only in the area represented by cate-
gories 1-3 that a further factor-adequate warning-must be applied
before the lawfulness of the copying can be determined. This may be
presented in true-false tabular form, based on whether adequate warn-
ing is:
TABLE II
Feasible Given Copying Lawful
(A) T T T
(B) T F F
(C) F F T
III. "MISAPPROPRIATION" VERSUS "PUBLIC INJURY"
The misappropriation doctrine is applied at times without explicit
recognition, as in the Notre Dame and Atmos Clock cases. Again,
"misappropriation" may be relied upon, as in the Mustard Seed case,
without extended doctrinal exposition. In these circumstances, "mis-
appropriation" has not been given harsh treatment in the courts. But
when the courts have examined the doctrine with more care, they fre-
quently have refused to give it any more than a nominal scope. The
reception of the New York statute in the federal courts since the
Mustard Seed case illustrates these conflicts and highlights, we
believe, the essential inadequacies of the whole misappropriation
doctrine.
and unfair competition cases. The teaching of the cases which is distilled by the court
is that, despite loose language in many opinions that functional configurations are
incapable of indicating source of origin, such features clearly can and do signify source,
but "there is an overriding public policy of preventing their monopolization, of pre-
serving the public right to copy." 289 F.2d at 504. Compare RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 721, comment a (1938). Hence, registration of the mark, with consequent legal
recognition of the exclusive right in it of the applicant, was denied. In so holding,
the court recognized the risk of public deception entailed, but concluded that, on
balance, "a certain amount of purchaser confusion may even be tolerated in order
to give the public the advantages of free competition." 289 F.2d at 504.
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Section 368-d of the New York General Business Law establishes,
as a ground for injunctive relief, "likelihood of injury to business repu-
tation . . . in cases of . . . unfair competition, notwithstanding the
absence of . . . confusion as to the source of goods ... , 140 As
worded, the statute does not forbid all copying of goods. It is im-
probable that this would even have been intended,141 for the consequent
encroachment on the common right to compete would be un-
paralleled.1' In any event, the courts have declined so to construe
the statute, reading the two qualifying phrases of the section ("likeli-
hood of injury" and "case of unfair competition") as limitations on
its scope.
Thus, in Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co.,143 the
court of appeals denied a preliminary injunction against copying pub-
lic domain ideas (descriptive marks and names long used for goods
by the industry), because there could be no "injury" to plaintiff as a
consequence of such copying. The reasoning of the court appears to
be that the only "injury" to the innovator from copying public domain
matter is the injury occasioned by the existence of free competition, to
which the "innovator" (that is, he who first appropriates) will not be
heard to object when he raises the cry of "misappropriation." 144 This
view was expressed even more emphatically in Vacheron & Constantin-
140 The section further provides for injunctions against "dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trade name or trade-mark . . . in case of trade-mark infringement or
unfair competition," despite absence of source confusion. The Massachusetts statute,
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 110, §7A (1954), has substantially the same wording as the
New York act. GA. CODE ANN. § 106-115 (1956) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 22
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961) are also "antidilution" statutes, although they are worded
differently.
141 Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389-90 (1951);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ; Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion of L. Hand, J.).
These cases appear to suggest that the New York law would burden commerce and con-
flict with the federal patent and copyright laws if its intent were to foreclose all copying.
See also Kessler & Stern, supra note 109, at 100 n.455 (final query on conflict with
Sherman Act). See generally KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPEITION, AND OTHER Topics 613-14 (2d ed. 1960).
142 Compare Case of the Clothworkers of Ipswich, Godbolt 252, 78 Eng. Rep. 147
(K.B. 1653); Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B.
1614) ; The Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke 84a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602) ; The
Schoolmaster Case, Y.B. Hil. 4 Hen. 11, f. 47, pl. 21 (1409). We suggest here, in
a very tentative way, a substantive due process consideration not for purposes of
making an unconstitutionality argument, as such, but for purposes of negativing an
interpretation of the legislative "intent!' that would require a reading of questionable
constitutionality. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
143 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956). Accord, Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Guardian Nat!1 Life Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp 851, 855 (E.D. La. 1960).
144 This is, of course, a damnurn absque injuria argument. See 3 RESTATEMENT,
TORTS 537 (1938) ; cf. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 140 (1939) ;
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-85 (1938); Stratton v. Conway, 201
Tenn. 582, 301 S.W.2d 332 (1957) ("blockbusting" held damnumn absque injuria on
policy grounds). It should also be noted that courts usually condition grant of in-
junctive relief on a showing of irreparable injury. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959) ; State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561,
568 (1934).
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Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 45 in which the in-
novator was denied relief against the copying of his watch design on
the ground that there was no likelihood of injury to business reputa-
tion, within the meaning of section 368-d, absent secondary meaning.
Taking a slightly different approach, in Kitchens of Sara Lee.. Inc. v.
Nifty Foods Corp.,146 the court of appeals held that unless the product
had acquired a secondary meaning as originating with plaintiff there
could be no "case of unfair competition," to which class of case the
statute is in terms restricted.
These narrow constructions are not dictated merely by the courts'
fussiness over the semantic contradiction between the statutory phrases
"likelihood of injury" in "cases of unfair competition" and "ab-
sence of confusion as to source." These courts are hardly unaware
that damnum absque injuria, like "proximate cause," is a policy no-
tion,'47 or that "cases of unfair competition" can be redefined by the
legislature in a sense different from that of the common law, at least in
principle. The statute has invited restrictive construction by neglect-
ing to define effectively the scope of injury-which is to say that it
fails to redefine the common-law boundaries of the public domain. No
definite legislative standard is established for distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible copying. 4 When the courts, par-
ticularly the federal appellate courts, so construe section 368-d as to
deny it any real scope of application, they would appear to be com-
pelled to do so for want of a legislative standard, if they are to keep
the statute from making perilous and unlimited inroads on the public
domain.' This is, we believe, the reason for the substantial failure
of the New York statute to reshape the case law.
'45 155 F. Supp. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified on other grounds, 260 F.2d
637 (2d Cir. 1958). By the same token, the argument can be made that absent sec-
ondary meaning there can be no "dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or
trade-mark," see note 139 supra, for there is nothing to dilute. One can water down
milk, but one cannot water down water. Compare Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food
Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D. Mass. 1948) and Skil Corp. v. Barnet, 337 Mass.
485, 490, 150 N.E2d 551, 554 (1958), with Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc.,
177 F.2d 177, 185 (1st Cir. 1949) (affirming district court decree supra).
146 266 F.2d 541, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United
Plastic Co., 189 F. Supp. 333, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd (on the basis of the "inde-
terminate general law"), 294 F.2d 694, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1961) (also relying on Pepto-
Bisnol case). Among other cases which attempted to distinguish or restrict § 368
are Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Contonniere v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc.,
299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) (Pepto-Bismol case);
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959);
Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelty Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y.
1959), but they contribute less to the advancement of the analysis.
147 See note 60 supra.
148 See 69 HARv. L. Rx'v. 392, 393 (1955).
149 Compare the cases denying enforcement to incomprehensibly vague statutes
without relying upon particular constitutional provisions, e.g., United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174 (1952); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). See also Aigler,
Legislation. in Vague or Gewral Terms, 21 MIcH. L. REV. 831 (1923); Note, 109
U. PA. L. RFv. 67 n.2 (1960).
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Nor has any other legislature (or court) succeeded in formulating
a rationale for misappropriation which more adequately delineates the
scope of the interest to be protected.50 This absence of definition of
the altered boundary of the public domain does not result, we believe,
from lack of ingenuity in draftsmanship or even from mere unwilling-
ness of misappropriation doctrine supporters to admit that they are
proponents of an enclosure movement. It is submitted that the defect
is deeper: The inability to define misappropriation with any precision
is the necessary consequence of the inherent vagueness of the subject
matter.
Proponents of the misappropriation theory have defended its
vagueness on the ground that it permits flexible adjustment to meet a
variety of fact situations as they arise.'51 This is, we submit, to take
refuge in a case-by-case analysis that amounts in the end to no analysis
at all.1 2 To the extent that law should serve a predictive function, a
law of unfair competition based on case-by-case determination of
whether there has been misappropriation fails abysmally in its task.
The effect of this juridical risk on the small businessman who cannot
afford to make blind guesses which may cause the destruction of his
business is manifest; the result of the misappropriation doctrine may
well be the discouragement of even such copying as might ultimately
be held legitimate under the most ambitious misappropriation theory.1es
Moreover, the "convenient vagueness" 154 of the misappropriation doc-
trine is objectionable on more general grounds. Basically, what de-
fenders of the vagueness theory of unfair competition law contemplate
is a carte blanche to the courts to write their own code of business
morality' 55 But as Professor Kessler has observed in another con-
text: "[I]f carried to its logical conclusion [this] may mean an enor-
mous increase in control over private volition which may in turn re-
150 See, e.g., statutes cited note 140 supra. See also H.R. 4590, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961).
151 E.g., Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAND.
L. REv. 483, 496-98 (1958) ; 107 CoNG. REc. 2439 (1961) (explanatory statement on
H.R. 4590).
152See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
1 5The devastating uncertainty and disastrous risks to small businessmen which
are created by nebulous and permissive judicial standards for determining what copy-
ing is permissible or impermissible are discussed in the concurring opinion of Black, J.,
in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 357-59 (1961).
154 See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 569 (1953) ("far from specific
standards!' of Clayton Act regarded as desirable and consistent with "convenient
vagueness" needed in antitrust proceedings).
155 See H.R. 4590, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1961) ("violates reasonable
standards of commercial ethics"), as explained in 107 CONG. REc. 2439 (1961).
See also Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L.
REv. 583, 600-01 (1958) ("contrary to commercial good faith or to the normal
and honorable development" of industrial, commercial, agricultural, or other business
activities).
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sult in the imposition of a tyrannical stranglehold on the behavior
patterns of the community." 16
The further deficiency of the misappropriation doctrine, apart
from the necessary consequences of its ill-defined compass, is that to
the extent it articulates any policy, it dictates the sacrifice of public in-
terests to protect the assertion of private interests. 157  Because it is
neither related to nor restricted to the aspect of the public interest safe-
guarded by the traditional rule, that of preventing consumer deception,
the misappropriation doctrine endangers the public interest in free
competition without compensating public benefits. 158 To be sure, some
conceive the function of an unfair competition law based on mis-
appropriation to be complementarily related to the public interest, in
that it will provide merely "a reasonable supplement" to the public-
interest-oriented Federal Trade Commission Act in order to protect
private interests. 9 But such a "supplemental" approach overlooks the
fact that the public interest is always involved in the regulation of com-
petition: to "supplement" is pro tanto to "supplant." 160 Whenever
copying is prohibited, the scope of competition in the production and
marketing of the copied product is likewise reduced, thereby compro-
mising to some degree the basic free enterprise premise "that the un-
restrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress." 161
To be sure, all this may occasionally conflict with the basic prop-
osition that people ought not to be deceived. But when the public
interest in competition is unopposed by another public interest, we sub-
mit that it ought not to be compromised. Whatever merits the mis-
156 Kessler, mipra note 112, at 167 (discussion of good faith). See also Rushmore
v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1908) (dictum:
if the law of unfair competition be pushed much further, result may be intolerable
state of judicial paternalism) ; text preceding note 97 mtpra.
157 See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570-71
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) (Moore, J.: "Distaste for sharp or
unethical business practices has often caused the courts to lose sight of the fundamental
consideration in the law of unfair competition-protection of the public."). See also
note 138 .upra.
158 An excellent articulation of this view, which did not, however, prevent the
grant of sweeping and perhaps unjustifiable relief against the copying of functional
features in the public domain, when a requirement of warning might have sufficed to
protect the public against deception, is found in American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber,
269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
159 See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 406, 438 (1961).
160 Compare McGuire Act § 2(a) (2)-(4), 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(2)-(4) (1958); Robinson-Patman Act §§2, 2a, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§§13, 13a (1958).
161 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). This may be
restated more colorfully in the language then Assistant Attorney General Thurman
Arnold used in the oral argument of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940)-"Thank God for the chiseler."
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appropriation doctrine may have in the neutral case (category 8
s pra) or where fair warning is not feasible, and we doubt that it has
any there, certainly it is without merit when there is functionality or
descriptiveness or when there is no consumer deception (because there
is no secondary meaning or because there is fair warning).
The conclusion we draw is that preservation of the proper rule
of unfair competition law depends on the retention of likelihood of con-
sumer deception, which means retention of secondary meaning, as an
indispensable condition to the maintenance of the innovator's suit.
Abandonment of the "public injury" requirement in these private trade
regulation suits would most unfortunately restrain those competitive
forces on whose action our economy is based, and would impair the
personal freedom from state action to which our social order is
dedicated.
